Hezbollah: An Iranian Project? by Ante Lucic
 









Hezbollah, which in Arabic stands for the “Party of God,” has 
over the last few decades grown into one of the most 
influential Lebanese political organizations and militias. 
Hezbollah was conceived in the midst of the violent civil War 
of Lebanon, and in its early stage it often resorted to terrorist 
acts. However, over the years it has gradually transformed 
into a legitimate political current. The Party differs from the 
other Middle Eastern factors in that it has never been 
defeated or severely weakened by Israel. Hezbollah is a 
Shiite fundamentalist party and thus it is strategically 
supported by the Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran. By 
observing the Party’s dynamics, actions, agenda, hierarchy, 
structure, and rhetoric, one can identify many direct links to 
the Islamic Republic. This implies that Iran had been heavily 
involved in the Party’s founding and organization. 





































ideologically, financially, and logistically dependent upon 
Iran, it is valid to wonder whether it is, likewise, controlled by 
Iran. When the mentioned elements are taken into account, 
it becomes rather apparent that Hezbollah is most probably 
the Iranian proxy in Lebanon, serving as the extended arm 
of influence in a deeply divided country of Lebanon, and in 
the vicinity of the State of Israel. There have been numerous 
speculations, mostly in the media, about whether Hezbollah 
is indeed an Iranian project. However, the notion of 
Hezbollah being the Iranian creation has been somewhat 
avoided in the academic circles, and a properly composed 
academic analysis has been lacking.  Yet, as this brief paper 
will show, there is a number of undeniable facts which point 
into this direction. If it is true that Hezbollah is an Iranian 
tool, this knowledge will greatly impact future analyses and 
research on the subject, especially when regional power 
relations and Iranian foreign policy are concerned. Also, this 
phenomenon is explainable in terms of the politics of 
realism, since it is most likely the Iranian rational interest to 
keep investing into and to sustain the grip on this Shiite 
group for geopolitical and religious purposes. On the other 
hand, whenever asked about this possible feature, 
Hezbollah’s leadership has energetically denied it, asserting 
that the Party is exclusively a Lebanese creation—a result of 
the Lebanese sociopolitical realities. However, bearing in 
mind the Party’s sustained successes and power in 
Lebanon, as well as its mentioned “Iranian” features, does 
spark curiosity as to whether a much bigger sponsor (or a 
controller) stands in its shadow.  
Introduction 
The year of 1982 has been one of the most significant ones 
in both Lebanese and Middle Eastern modern history. What 
took place were two major developments which have 
changed the course of local and regional political affairs. 
June 4, 1982 marked the beginning of a full-scale Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon with the goal of destroying, or at least 
weakening the anti-Israeli Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO)1. The second crucial development was 
the formation of the Shiite resistance movement of 
Hezbollah, whose name translates into ‘the Party of God.’ 
This military and political group came to exist within a few 
months following the Israeli invasion. In order to understand 
                     



























  some key operational aspects and the actual role of this 
fundamentalist Shiite group, as well as its regional and 
international significance, it is necessary to inspect its origin, 
early stage, as well as the factors that contributed to the 
building of its functional capacities. The religious and moral 
fundamentals of Hezbollah are based upon its “claims of 
deep faith and a literal interpretation of God’s words as 
expressed in the Koran” (Harik 2005: 1).  
One of the main issues that one is confronted with 
whenever Hezbollah’s origins, role, and achievements are 
discussed is the dilemma of who really stands behind the 
scene. Even though such analyses can be considered 
somewhat “conspirational,” it is still absolutely valid to 
wonder whether Hezbollah is a purely Lebanese project of 
resistance against Israel, or if it is a long-term geopolitical 
project of the Shiite-dominated Islamic Republic of Iran, 
which wishes to have its own strategic enclave, or at least 
an extended arm of influence in the multicultural state of 
Lebanon. In simpler words, whose truly is Hezbollah; Iranian 
or Lebanese? 
Hezbollah is often described as: Iran-backed, Iran-
supported, pro-Iranian, fundamentalist, terrorist, purely 
Iranian, etc.; but not enough has been done to construct a 
proper academic research in order to answer this crucial 
question. While many researchers have been putting 
Hezbollah into the Iranian context, Hezbollah’s top officials 
repeatedly remind that Hezbollah is exclusively a product of 
the organized Islamic Resistance in Lebanon, which claims 
to be only ideologically supported by Iran.  
However, my research indicates that these somewhat 
populist statements can easily be proven incorrect. 
Hezbollah has been politically, economically and militarily 
dependent on the Islamic Republic from its earliest 
beginnings. Hezbollah was conceived thanks to Iran. It 
directly resembles the operational, ideological, structural, 
and political standards that were put forth by the Iranian 
Islamic Revolution. Its fundamental executive capacities and 
decision-making have been exposed to and affected by the 
Iranian government, since the Iranian Supreme leadership 
(which at the time of Hezbollah’s foundation was headed by 
the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini) has had the final word on the 
crucial matters of the Party. This short paper shall discuss 
the weight of these arguments, which aim to justify the idea 
Hezbollah being more likely an Iranian project than, as its 
officials claim, a “self-propelled” Lebanese movement.  
Finally, seeing Hezbollah as the Iranian project leaves 





































With this assumption, one can easily apply the realist model 
to explain ambitions and behavior of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran—the country that tends to be rather politically 
problematic for the Western community. It is in realist 
approach where one shall look for an answer to why Iran 
has “invested” or even founded the Party in the first place. 
Firstly, the Party’s Iran-orchestrated evolution shall be 
extensively covered before one is able to apply the model. 
Tracing Hezbollah’s Iranian Origins and Control 
The current Secretary General of Hezbollah, Sayyid Hassan 
Nasrallah touched upon the mentioned dilemma in the 
interview given on September 11, 1992 to the Lebanese 
pan-Arab magazine Al-Watan Al-Arabi. Nasrallah hereby 
declared: 
 
Hezbollah is in fact the outcome of a self-propelled 
movement launched in the wake of the Israeli invasion of 
1982. This means that it is the outcome of the will and 
decision of a group of Lebanese people who were 
inspired by Khomeini’s ideology, and who took 
advantage of the climate created by the Islamic 
Revolution, and Syrian support, to launch a resistance 
movement against the occupation (Noe 2007: 92).  
 
Later, describing the Party’s structure, Nasrallah 
characterized it as the outcome of the merger between 1) a 
number of people that separated from the Shiite Islamic 
Amal faction; 2) The Ulama—the group of Shiite religious 
authorities and clergymen; and 3) Shiites affiliated to the 
Party of Islamic Daawa in Lebanon under Sheikh Subhi 
Tufeili2. 
It is the Daawa Party that proves direct Iranian 
involvement. Unlike Nasrallah, Tufeili (Hezbollah’s former 
Secretary General) points out that “Hezbollah is in essence 
the Daawa party from which [they] removed the title of 
Daawa and entered it into military rounds in order for it to 
start the resistance” (Jaber 1997: 54). However, the truth is 
that Daawa originates from Iraq, where it was supported by 
the pro-Iranian Iraqi Shiites, whose ideology came straight 
from Ayatollah Khomeini’s circle in Najaf (Dekmeijan 1985: 
166-168). Here, the octopus’ arm stretches directly from the 
                     



























  Iranian revolutionary leader Khomeini to the Party’s 
foundations.  
 Hezbollah was extremely secretive from its earliest 
stages. Even though its militiamen were quite visible, not 
much was known about the Party’s hierarchy and the actual 
foundation. Also, given that in 1982 the Lebanese Civil War 
anarchy was at its maximum, the formation of the new 
current could be neither immediately noticed nor 
successfully covered by intelligence agencies (Jaber 1997: 
47-53). If it is true that Hezbollah owes its existence to Iran, 
this clandestine atmosphere might have been favorable for 
establishing and consolidating hardly visible vectors of 
control of the Islamic Republic over the newly established 
Party. 
Even though it may seem that the Party receives merely 
an ideological inspiration from Iran, the landmark document, 
Hezbollah’s Manifesto of February 16, 1985, proves 
otherwise. Having the image of Ayatollah Khomeini on the 
back cover, the actual content of this manifesto clearly 
shows the Party’s Iranian orientation, and clarifies that its 
most supreme leadership lies in Teheran. The key part 
quotes:  
 
We, the sons of Hezbollah’s nation in Lebanon, whose 
vanguard God has given victory in Iran and which has 
established the nucleus of the world’s central Islamic 
state, abide by the orders of a single wise and just 
command currently embodied in the supreme exemplar 
of Ayatollah Khomeini (Jaber 1997: 54-55).  
 
Furthermore, this document endorsed the concept of 
wilayat al-fatih. It literally stands for ‘the Jurisdiction of the 
Jurist-Theologian,’ who was nobody else but Khomeini 
himself. Nicholas Noe (2007) argued that “Hezbollah’s, 
allegiance to the principle of wiliyat al-fatih opened the party 
to charges that it followed non-nationalist—and in particular 
Iranian—dictates, since it apparently had to comply with any 
decision issued by the fatih” (p.26). Essentially, this 
Manifesto calls for the establishment of the Islamic State in 
Lebanon, based on the example provided by the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (Hamzeh 2004: 146). When all of this is 
taken into account, it becomes very clear who might hold the 
strings. Hypothetically speaking, given the Iranian executive 
and legal powers regarding the Party, if successful, Shiite 
Lebanon would become at least a satellite state, if not the 
Iranian-controlled enclave in the Levantine Middle Eastern 





































there is a great possibility that Hezbollah indeed is an 
Iranian organization and its geopolitical tool.  
The Lebanese Shiites have often shown their respect for 
the Islamic State idea in numerous campaigns through 
Party’s propaganda, as well as the general Party’s 
“aesthetics,” especially in the early period. Here, the 
deviation from inspiration-only to an all-out support of the 
Iranian authorities becomes visually noticeable. During the 
first years of Hezbollah’s existence, when it was becoming 
clear that the new Shiite current had been introduced to 
Lebanon, the militiamen could often be seen wearing green 
bands around their heads containing inscriptions such as 
‘Qaaiduna Khomeini,’ (‘Our Leader is Khomeini’). Posters of 
the Ayatollah could be found virtually everywhere, while the 
Shiite women and young girls rapidly transformed their 
clothing style into a more traditional Shiite outfit 
characteristic of that prevalent in Iran, both as a sign of 
support and compliance with Hezbollah’s new “tradition,” as 
well as to avoid harassment by radicals. Furthermore, 
Khomeini’s slogans such as “USA=Great Satan” have often 
been put in the streets of many Lebanese cities on public 
display (Jaber 1997: 52-53).  
 
Hezbollah as a Potential Instrument of the Global Islamic 
Revolution 
Concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran alone, it is 
necessary to introduce some of the arguments of John 
Simpson (1988), another expert of the Iranian affairs. In his 
book Inside Iran, he argues that Hezbollah, as we know it, 
had come out as a branch of the Iranian Hezbollah, which 
had been permanently stationed in Iran. This original Iranian 
Hezbollah, as he argues, was founded in 1979 upon 
Khomeini’s revolutionary return to Iran, and has ever since 
been used as a symbol of patriotism and Shiite religiosity, as 
well as the tool for ideological and organizational 
strengthening of the official ruling Islamic Republican Party 
(IRP). Simpson further argues that the establishment of the 
relationship and active contact with the Lebanese Shiites 
was realized through the Iranian organization called Global 
Islamic Movement (p. 90-100). If the original idea of 
Hezbollah had been, as it is hereby argued, only a part of 
the Global Islamic Movement, then the nomenclature itself 



























  the sake of the Iranian foreign and international strategic 
purposes, since this movement is supposed to be Islamic 
and global. 
When observing the creation of Hezbollah in a bigger 
picture, and with global elements taken into account, Jaber’s 
(1997) claims tend to be quite similar to the ones mentioned 
by Simpson. Once he took power, the Grand Ayatollah 
Khomeini aspired to revive the ‘Umma’ which can be 
understood as the worldwide Islamic caliphate. Khomeini 
aspired to eventually become ‘Amir al-Munimum’—‘the 
Commander of the Faithful’ (p.109). Of course, this would 
have involved the mechanisms that would have ensured the 
export of this revolution in a somewhat similar way that the 
Soviet-controlled Comintern had tried to export socialism. 
Even though not many details are known about the Iranian-
instigated instruments for the export and spreading of the 
Islamic Revolution, some of the clues provided by the 
mentioned sources can reassure us that the creation and 
functioning of Hezbollah may be viewed as a part of this long 
term Iranian plan for regional domination. 
Concrete Iranian Involvement 
There is a number of well-known instances which convey the 
extent to which Iran was directly involved in the founding of 
the Party. When Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982, the 
leading Shiite clerics of Lebanon travelled to Teheran to 
attend the annual Islamic Conference. Iran immediately let 
the clerics know that it would assist them and volunteer in 
consolidating and strengthening the organized Shiite 
resistance in Lebanon. However, it is interesting that Subhi 
Tufeili, the previously mentioned Lebanese cleric and former 
Party’s SG became the “central figure in realizing Iran’s 
initiative: [he] became the first leader of the new Islamic 
movement. Hezbollah had been conceived” (Jaber 1997: 
47). This leads us to the next stage of observation of the 
Iranian involvement in Hezbollah’s affairs, which, since 
Hezbollah was now founded, would briefly analyze the 
implications of Iranian support for the Party’s political, 
economic, and military future. 
From the very beginning, Iran’s involvement proved to 
be more than just “voluntary assistance.” Instead, it 
becomes evident that the support was well organized and 
consistent, which, of course, raises the question of whether 
it can really be deemed merely as a support, or a carefully 





































From the early beginnings of Hezbollah’s existence, or more 
precisely after the mentioned conference in Teheran, Iran 
embarked on the arms-supplying of the Party and other pro-
Iranian groups and operatives elsewhere, through its 
Ministry of Intelligence and Internal Security. The initial 
budget for such foreign military supplies was equal to $210 
million, and through Bank Markazi Iran the Islamic Republic 
had channeled part of their funds to Hezbollah and its 
operatives in southern Lebanon. The Ministry of Intelligence 
and Internal Security controlled the Iranian Arms 
Procurement Agency through which both Hezbollah and 
Syria were supplied. The Agency operated in quite a 
clandestine and “blurry” manner. What attests to this is the 
fact that this agency was based in the National Iranian Oil 
Company’s offices in Victoria Street in London, and was 
forcefully closed down by the British government in 1987 for 
having been, as Simpson (1988) put it, “the clearing-house 
for all the orders for weapons, missiles and ammunition 
which Iran [bought] throughout the world.” (p. 209-210). 
However, by the late 1990s the Party’s financing has 
adopted a more stabilized trend: as it has been estimated in 
the U.S. State Department reports pertaining to the state of 
global terrorism, Hezbollah had annually been receiving 
approximately $100 million in the form of pure financial 
support from Iran (Noe 2007: 96).  
Besides helping the military operations through its 
financial support, Iran has also provided Hezbollah with 
great deal of instruction and military guidance. After 1982, 
about 1000-1500 Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps 
(IRGC), called “Pastaran” were sent to Bekaa valley to train 
and to help the already employed PLO instructors train 
Hezbollah’s fighters, as well as to assist with the actual 
arming of the new divisions. The success of these actions 
can be easily seen in the fact that in the early stage, 
Hezbollah had mobilized more than 7000 of its partisans. It 
was the Iranian government who provided monthly salaries 
to those troops (Harik 2005: 40; Noe 2007: 26).  
Ultimately, the survival and later development of the 
Party would have hardly been possible had it solely relied on 
inspiration and motivation provided by Iran and its Islamic 
Revolution. In order to not only survive but to make a 
difference in the Lebanese chaos, Hezbollah needed more 
than just sheer rhetoric, and this is exactly what it got: Iran’s 
money and weapons were received, while the Pastaran took 
charge of the Party’s resistance operations, security, and 



























  has clearly been an “invisible” controller of Hezbollah’s 
actions and growth in general. 
 
Iranian “Hezbollah Project” in the Realist Perspective 
If the previously mentioned arguments succeed in making 
one able to at least consider the possibility of Hezbollah 
being an Iranian project, the questions are why, and what 
this can mean for the regional/international relations and 
security. Assuming that Hezbollah indeed is the Iranian 
instrument, this Iranian undercover policy may be almost 
perfectly explained by observing the basic tenets of the 
realist approach to international relations and security; more 
specifically using the premises of realism in international 
relations as outlined by Holsti (2004). 
 Ever since the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979, 
Iran has been often denounced by the West as 
fundamentalist and radical, to the extent that ever since 
1984 it has constantly been on the U.S. Department of 
State’s list as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.3 Meanwhile, 
many different sets of sanctions have been imposed against 
it. The ultimate threat to the country’s integrity became 
apparent during its war against Iraq, while the current 
situation continues to be tense due to the Iranian alleged 
nuclear program and its potential confrontation with Israel 
(Jafarzadeh 2007: 17, 202).  
Now, since the Iranian regime seems to have felt 
threatened from the very beginning, and since in realism 
there is no world authority to manage crises and disputes, 
one could say that Iran’s behavior portrays the so-called 
“security dilemma.” In the self-help anarchic world, the 
“search for security often leaves its current and potential 
adversaries insecure” (Holsti 2004: 53). Hezbollah may be 
viewed as the link which would decrease the chances for 
Israel (who Iran clearly sees as a threat) to engage in hostile 
actions against it. On the other hand, Hezbollah can be 
easily mobilized and deployed, and as such threaten the 
Israeli interests, while disrupting the potential actions against 
the Iranian “mainland.” Since Hezbollah truly is a strong 
political and military organization in Lebanon, it is logical to 
assume that it is viewed as a constant threat to the Israel’s 
national security. This simultaneous posing of threats could 
                     





































remind one of the game theory, out of which, at least in this 
particular case the balance of power situation emerges.  
Since this realist balance of power becomes the subject 
to relative capabilities of actors, conflict becomes a rather 
natural state of affairs, where “those that fail to cope with it 
will not survive” (Holsti 2004: 53). This state of affairs 
provides powerful incentives for hostile interactions between 
the two actors. Hezbollah has confronted Israel during the 
Civil War, in numerous side-operations, as well as in the 
“Thirty Day War of 2006” (Rubin 2007: 219). Israel has seen 
that troublesome security crisis can come from as near as 
across the border, from a group that is either pro-Iranian or 
Iranian itself. 
Realism postulates that state behavior is rational, i.e. 
guided by the logic of the national self-interest, which is 
normally defined in terms of power, relative capabilities, 
survival, and security (Holsti 2004: 54). Iran’s developed 
perception that they may become a target in the future, has 
become most relevant ever since the U.S. invaded Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In order to satisfy the needs of the Iranian 
national interests (keeping the regional hegemony, national 
security, and, in the worst case scenario, fighting for 
survival), Hezbollah has come to be only one of the “aces” 
Iran constantly holds on alert in order to tip the bargain, or at 
least to lower the successes of the U.S.’s ally Israel in their 
potential attacks (Polk 2007: 220). 
The discussed situation clearly portrays the final premise 
of realism, namely the assumption that the states, as unitary 
actors, “in their actions primarily respond to external rather 
than domestic political forces” (Holsti 2004: 54). As 
mentioned above, having the enclave political organization 
of Hezbollah in the Levantine part of the Middle East not 
only allows Iran to exert its own power influence, but it also 
enables it to have a prepared unit in case the existence of 
the Islamic Republic’s regime becomes threatened by 
external factors.           
Conclusion 
Clearly, Hezbollah still remains a very mysterious and 
controversial phenomenon. Nowadays when it has become 
the Lebanese political reality, after gradually having taken 
the shape of a legitimate political movement, many 
questions still remain unanswered. Nevertheless, Hezbollah 
still remains heavily dependent on Teheran, which points 



























  founding and initial realization. In this paper, I have tried to 
analyze the arguments that would support the assumption of 
the Party of God being a predominantly Iranian geopolitical 
project, via which Iran can exert pressure on both religious 
and political developments outside its immediate domain—in 
this case the Levantine Middle East.  
When observing Hezbollah’s original goals: the freeing 
of what is referred to as the Occupied Palestinian Territories; 
establishment of the Iran-like Islamic state in Lebanon; the 
spreading of the Islamic Revolution as advocated by 
Khomeini—can all be viewed as nothing else but the 
elements of the Iranian foreign policy. Besides the 
inspiration provided by the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the 
once marginalized and somewhat backward Shiite society 
would have hardly been able to survive the chaos of the 
Lebanese Civil War, challenge the Israelis, and become one 
of the key players in the region had it not been for the actual 
“physical” and organizational support coming from Teheran. 
From the very beginning, Hezbollah was supplied, funded, 
and trained by Iran, and it continues to be up to this date. 
Therefore, in order to be able to analyze Hezbollah’s 
activities in the future, the policy makers, political scientists 
and religious scholars must not neglect the actual interests 
and the extent of the Iranian involvement in the Party’s 
existence, functioning, and operations. When Hezbollah is 
analyzed on military, socioeconomic, or political grounds, the 
Iran-factor shall be set as one of the crucial points of 
analysis.  
In order to understand the reasons and dynamics behind 
the Iranian support for Hezbollah, as well as the behavior of 
Iran itself, this relationship should be put into the realist 
context, in order to be able to identify the manner in which 
Iran is fighting a double war: keeping regional supremacy 
through its proxies like Hezbollah, and trying to make it as 
difficult as possible for the Islamic regime to fall by showing 
itself as ready to deploy these same proxies for its own 
security.   
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